New Ohio Supreme Court writing-citation manual released

The Ohio Supreme Court has issued a new comprehensive writing/citation manual to be applied in its opinions starting Jan. 1, 2012. The new guide replaces the original "Manual of Citations",issued in 1985, the May 2002 "interim version", and a subsequent later revision.

“Divided into three parts,” the Court’s announcement says, “the new manual contains guidance on proper citation format for opinions, cases, and statutes in Supreme Court opinions; proper style for Supreme Court opinions; and a new section with examples on how to structure an opinion.”

Several significant changes are noted, including:

• The federal circuits are now identified using “Cir.,” e.g., 6th Cir. instead of C.A.6.


• Federal statutes are now cited using “U.S.C.,” e.g., 42 U.S.C. 1982 instead of Section 1982, Title 42, U.S. Code.


• Ohio case citations no longer include Ohio Bar Reports (OBR) or Ohio Opinions (O.O., O.O.2d, O.O.3d).

Manual instructions also cover how to cite opinions before and after May 1, 2002, when the Supreme Court began posting all opinions online.

New Writing Manual (PDF)

Ohio bench - jury trial legislation

The Cleveland Plain Dealer, last weekend, carried a story about former Summit County prosecutor Lynn Slaby, who is now a state representative, introducing a bill last month by at the urging of the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association that would change Ohio law to give themselves veto power when a criminal defendant chooses to have his case heard by a judge instead of a jury. [See text and analysis of HB 265, introduced June 14, 2011]

The Ohio Judicial Conference, which opposes the bill, notes that its recent impact statement that “Ohio is one of twenty-one states granting criminal defendants the right to choose whether they will be tried by jury or by the judge, and does not require the consent of the prosecuting attorney to waive jury trials. The remaining 29 states, the Federal system, and Washington D.C. require the consent of the prosecuting attorney in order to waive trial by jury.

The Judicial Conference’s impact statement also briefs some relevant case history, including the Ohio Supreme Court’s upholding the validity of then General Code 13442-4 that in all criminal cases pending in state courts of record in this state, the defendant shall have the right to trial by jury, and may, if s/he so elects, be tried by the court without a jury… [ State v. Smith, 123 O St. 237 (1931)] [General Code 13442-4 is now ORC § 2945.05; See also §2945.06 with respect to “Procedures for trial by court" ]

The Judicial Conference also addressed the federal aspect, noting that in Singer v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court examined whether a criminal defendant in a federal criminal case has an unconditional constitutional right to a trial by jury, and whether there was also a correlative constitutional right for a criminal defendant to have is/her case decided by the judge alone if s/ he considers such a trial to be to her/ his advantage. [ Singer v. US, 380 US 24 (1965)]. The Court held that there is no constitutional or federally recognized right to a criminal trial before a judge sitting alone, and, citing Patton v. United States, reaffirmed their previous holding that a defendant can waive the right to trial by jury. [ Patton v. US 281 US 276 (1930)].

Ohio Supreme Court juvenile sex offender cases

A Newark Advocate article last week describes the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision to review whether “requiring a 17-year-old boy to register as a sex offender for touching girls' breasts violates the constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment.

In the case pursuant a 17-year-old boy was found delinquent of sexual imposition and disorderly conduct, both the equivalent of misdemeanor offenses back in July 2010, according to the article. He had been expelled from high school, but was then also required to register as a Tier I sex offender for the next 15 years. His attorney thinks that’s “cruel & unusual punishment.” [ Memorandum in support ]

The Advocate’s article indicated that this case, from Licking County, is “joining a number of other cases disputing how sex offender registration is applied to juveniles here in Ohio.” The Court heard arguments on an Athens County case last February addressing the application of In re Smith (2008-1624), In re Adrian (2009-0189); and State v. Bodyke (2008-2502) as they may apply to juveniles and the “public registry-qualified juvenile offender registrant” (PRQJOR) provisions of Senate Bill 10, now codified at ORC § 2152.86. The Athens County case will set guidelines for the state’s future considerations. (Court's Acceptance)

In way of review, Bodyke, in 2010, found that portions of Senate Bill 10 (Ohio’s “Adam Walsh Act”), authorizing the attorney general to reclassify sex offenders, were unconstitutional. State v. Williams, this past summer, extended that to retroactive provisions of registration and community notification. In re Smith and Adrian had both dealt with retroactivity and were remanded for consideration in light of Williams.