State not required to prove mental state for use of force in third-degree robbery

The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled on Tuesday that the state does not have to prove a culpable mental state (mens rea) for certain elements of a third-degree robbery charge under O.R.C. 2911.02, according to Court News Ohio. Specifically, the Court found that no criminal intent is required on the elements of using or threatening to use force. The Court held that because there is already a mental state expressly required to prove the theft elements of the offense, the state is not required to prove a mental state for the other elements in the statute.

The case out of Montgomery County involved Kevin Tolliver, who shoplifted at a Dollar General Store. Employee Jasmine Jordan attempted to stop him. She testified at trial that he pushed her and she pushed him back and, then he raised his fist as if to hit her. Tolliver testified that he stole the items and raised his fist, but did not admit to pushing Ms. Jordan, although surveillance footage showed his actions. At trial, the jury instructions did not require the jury to make any findings about Tolliver’s intention to use force against Jordan. The jury convicted Tolliver, and he appealed, arguing that the court committed plain error by not requiring the state to prove that he had recklessly used force during the theft. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision.

Justice French, writing for the majority, held that because the robbery statute includes a required mental state for the theft portions of the statute, but remains silent on any required mental state for the use of force element, the Court would not impute a mental state to that second element. She wrote, “the state need prove culpability only for the elements for which a mental state is specified in the section defining the offense, and courts should not fill any gaps by inserting culpability requirements that the text and ordinary rules of construction cannot bear.”

She went on to distinguish O.R.C. 2901.21(B), which provides that for statutes which do not prescribe a required mental state or set a strict liability standard, the state must prove that the offender's actions were reckless. The Court held that this provision did not apply to the statute at issue, stating “because R.C. 2911.02 defines every robbery to include the culpable mental states of the predicate theft offense,  R.C. 2901.21(B) … does not apply, and the state need not prove a culpable mental state with respect to the force element in R.C. 2911.02(A)(3).” With this decision the Court found that O.R.C. 2901.21(B) does not apply to statutes when there is a section within that statute that provides a required mental state, holding that "there must be 'a complete absence of culpability in the section defining the offense.'"

Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor and Justices Terrence O’Donnell and Sharon L. Kennedy joined in the majority opinion. Justice Lanzinger drafted a dissent, which was joined by Justices Pfeifer and O’Neill.

See 2013-0351 for more information about the case.

Sixth Circuit overturns Amish beard- and hair-cutting convictions

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has recently overturned multiple convictions in a case involving forcible beard- and hair-cutting in the Amish community. Amish bishop Samuel Mullet and a group of 15 followers were convicted of hate crimes related to these actions by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in 2012. 

Mullet is the leader of an Amish community in Bergholz, a community in northern Ohio, which, the Plain Dealer reported, some refer to as a cult. His actions as leader have caused strife among neighboring Amish communities, as evidenced by witnesses in the 2012 court case, who alleged that he engaged in bizarre practices and implemented strict and strange discipline on his followers. According to the Plain Dealer, witnesses asserted that Mullet "read and censored all incoming and outgoing mail, punished wrongdoers with spankings and confinement in chicken coops, and engaged in sexual relations with several of the young married women under the guise of marital counseling and absolution."

Mullet is alleged to have orchestrated a series of forcible beard- and hair-cuttings as punishment for those who may have opposed him or been considered his enemies. Long beards for men and long hair for women are considered sacred among the Amish, who generally do not cut them once they are married; a practice they believe is prescribed by the Bible. A jury for the U.S. District Court of Northern Ohio found that the actions by Mullet and his followers amounted to a hate crime under federal law, significantly motivated by the victims' religious faith. Mullet was sentenced to 15 years in prison. 

On appeal, the 6th Circuit overturned the convictions, finding that Judge Polster used inappropriate jury instructions, thus adopting an incorrect standard for conviction under the hate crime laws. Polster's jury instructions included language that the victim's faith must be a "significant factor" motivating the crimes against them. In an opinion written by Justice Sutton, the 6th Circuit concluded that the district court should have used the standard proposed by defendants, that "the faith of the victims must be a “but for” cause of the assaults." According to the court this means that "the prosecution had to show that the defendants... assaulted the victims “because of” their religious beliefs." The court also concluded that this was not harmless error, as there could be question as to whether the attacks were motivated by religion or a confluence of factors based on the facts of the case.

Although the convictions have been overturned, the cases are likely far from over, as the 6th Circuit ruled that the double-jeopardy clause did not prevent prosecutors from pursuing new trials.

Dayton police officer immune from liability in sex discrimination case

Court News Ohio reports that the Supreme Court of Ohio reached a decision in the sex discrimination case involving the Dayton Police Department on August 28, finding that accused supervisor, Major E. Mitchell Davis, is immune from liability. The Court ruled that an individual employee cannot be held liable for employment discrimination under R.C. 4112.01(A)(2) and 4112.02(A), as those statutes only provide for vicarious liability for the employer based on the actions of their employees, not individual liability for the employees themselves.

The case involves accusations by police officer Anita Hauser against the Dayton Police Department and Davis, who was her supervisor. Hauser asserts that she was treated differently in her position as K-9 officer because of her age and gender. She specifically alleges that the DPD and Davis imposed certain working conditions, withheld her wages, subjected her to frivolous investigations and denied her opportunities for career advancement during her employment. The trial court granted summary judgment on all claims except for Hauser’s sex discrimination claims and Davis’s claims to immunity. Hauser voluntarily dismissed her claims and Davis appealed the issue of his immunity to the 2nd District Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling regarding Davis’s immunity and certified that this constituted a conflict with the 8th District Court of Appeals. The case proceeded to the Ohio Supreme Court.

Justice French, writing for the majority, stated that R.C. 4112.01(A)(2) and 4112.02(A) do not provide for individual liability, but that other portions of R.C. 4112 which expressly provide for individual liability still apply to individual political subdivision employees. In reaching this decision, the court distinguished its holding in Genaro v. Cent. Transport, Inc., stating that although they had found that an employee could be jointly and severally liable with the employer under R.C. 4112 in that case, the facts differed from the instant case, as the employer in Genaro was private, not public, and the Court did not address the specific issue of express liability and immunity in the Genaro decision.

The opinion was joined by Justices O’Connor and Lanzinger. Justice O’Donnell concurred in judgment only and Justices Pfeifer and O’Neill dissented in an opinion written by Justice Pfeifer. Justice Kennedy dissented separately. The full text of the decision can be found here.

For more information, see the dockets for cases 2013-0493 and 2013-0291.