Sixth Circuit suspect questioning opinion

Forty years ago, the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona and probably the best-known popular legal concept-- the immortal “right to remain silent” phrase-- was born.

Twenty-five years later, Miranda was enhanced & clarified with the Supreme Court’s holding that once a suspect in custody has asked for a lawyer, his questioning by police has to cease until counsel is present and cannot be resumed unless “the accused has himself initiated further communication, exchanges, or conversations with police.” [Edwards v. Arizona (1981)].

Now, the U.S. Sixth Circuit has added perhaps a new wrinkle in the defendant’s right arena -- that that communication can be, in fact, through a third party.

Exhausting his state court appeal options, Robert Van Hook, found guilty of capital murder and aggravated robbery, filed a habeas appeal in the Sixth District Court for Southern Ohio, which denied his petition. On appeal to the Sixth Circuit in April 2006, reversed and remanded, holding that police had violated Van Hook’s constitutional rights when they had resumed questioning him after having it been indicated by Van Hook’s mother that he wanted to continue with the interview. On petition by the State of Ohio, the Sixth Circuit decided to vacate its earlier decision and hear the case en banc.

In that consideration, on May 24,2007, the Sixth Circuit held that “the Supreme Court did not command in Edwards that a suspect must directly inform police he wants to talk, as opposed to informing them through a third party. The propriety of communication through a through a third party was not before the Court in Edwards, nor has the Court taken up the issue since that decision.”

Citing the Supreme Court in Dickerson v. United States (2000), and siding with sister courts in recent decisions in the 8th., 9th., and 11th. Circuits, the Sixth Circuit said, “No court laying down a general rule can possibly foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of modifications represented by [cases extending & restricting Miranda] are as much a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision.”