Supreme Court decides Pro Se compentency limits

The U.S. Supreme Court yesterday held that defendants found mentally competent enough to stand trial are not necessarily likewise competent enough to represent themselves at that trial. (Case )

Coming out of the state of Indiana, the trial court had relied on a lengthy amassing of psychiatric reports, noting that the defendant had been diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia, and concluding that, while he was competent to stand trial, he was not competent to represent himself.

He appealed that two years ago, the court there agreeing that the trial court’s refusal of self-representation deprived him of his constitutional right of self-representation under the Sixth Amendment and case precedent (Farretta v. California, 1975 ), and remanded the case.

Last year the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed that on the grounds that Faretta and Godinez v. Moran (1993 ) both required the defendant be allowed to defend himself.

The Supreme Court had “several considerations” in concluding that the Constitution in fact allows a state to limit a defendant’s right to self-representation:

Federal precedent, while not answering the question at hand, points in that direction. Dusky v. U.S. (1960 ) and Drope v. Missouri (1975) set forth the Constitution’s “mental competence” standard forbidding the trial of an individual lacking a rational & factual understanding of the proceedings and sufficient ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, but did not consider the relation of that “mental competence” standard with the right of self-representation. Faretta (supra), rested its self-representation conclusion in part on pre-existing state cases that are consistent with , and at least two of which expressly adopt, a competency limitation on the self-representation right.

The nature of mental illness cautions against a single competency standard to decide both whether a defendant who is represented can proceed to trial, and whether a defendant who goes to trial must be permitted to represent himself.

A self-representation right at trial will not “affirm the dignity” of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his own defense without the assistance of counsel , and may undercut the most basic of the Constitution’s criminal law objectives, that of providing a fair trial.