U.S. Supreme Court "Miranda" decisions

The United States Supreme Court, yesterday and the day before, issued rulings seen by some as further weakening defendants' Miranda rights.

Last Tuesday, the Court in Florida v. Powell held that Florida's alternative wording of the Miranda warning was acceptable, even though it does not explicitly state that a suspect has a right to have a lawyer present during questioning.

Maryland v. Shatzer, yesterday, established new, more permissive rules for police who want to question a suspect for a second time after the suspect invokes Miranda's right to remain silent.

Law.com this morning said that latter case in particular "weakens the so-called rule evolved from Edwards v. Arizona in 1981 , which stated that, once a suspect invokes Miranda, any subsequent waiver of the right triggered by a police request is deemed involuntary -- making further police questioning improper.

"Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority," that article said, "carved out an exception to the Edwards rule when there is a 'break in custody' between the first and subsequent police efforts to question the suspect, saying the rule should not act as an 'eternal' bar against further police questioning. 'In a country that harbors a large number of repeat offenders,' Scalia said, 'this consequence is disastrous.' In the interest of producing a clear rule on the issue, Scalia said the Court agreed that, after a 14-day 'break of custody,' police may try to question a suspect again without fear that a subsequent confession would be suppressed. 'That provides plenty of time for the suspect to get re-acclimated to his normal life ... and to shake off any residual coercive effect of his prior custody.' In Shatzer's case, Scalia said the fact that he was actually in prison during the 'break in custody' did not alter the calculus. Justices Clarence Thomas and John Paul Stevens joined Scalia's decision, except in the 14-day duration of the new rule."

In Tuesday's ruling in Florida v. Powell, Kevin Powell had been told he had 'the right to talk to a lawyer' before answering police questions, and that he could use 'any of these rights at any time you want' during the interview. He had then admitted to owning a handgun found by police and was charged with possession as a convicted felon in violation of Florida law. The trial court denied Powell's motion to suppress his inculpatory statements, based on the contention that the Miranda warnings he received did not adequately convey his right to the presence of an attorney during questioning. Powell was convicted of the gun-possession charge. On review the appellate court held that the trial court should have suppressed the statements, to which the Florida Supreme Court agreed.

But the Supreme Court, Tuesday, disagreed, repeating long-held precedent in saying, that "While the warnings prescribed by Miranda are invariable, this Court has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed. See, e.g., California v. Prysock, 453 U. S. 355, 359. In determining whether police warnings were satisfactory, reviewing courts are not required to 'examine [them] as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably 'conve[y] to [a suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.'" [ Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U. S. 195 ]


“Miranda v. Arizona” (Wikipedia)
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)