U.S. Supreme Court cases

The Unites States Supreme Court in its decision in Bloate v. United States Monday , reaffirmed that "The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Act) requires a criminal defendant's trial to commence within 70 days of his indictment or initial appearance,18 U. S. C. §3161(c)(1), and entitles him to dismissal of the charges if that deadline is not met, §3162(a)(2)…

The Act also "automatically excludes from the 70-day period 'delay resulting from . . . proceedings concerning the defendant,' 18 U. S. C. A. §3161(h)(1), and separately permits a district court to exclude 'delay resulting from a continuance' it grants, provided the court makes findings required by §3161(h)(7)."

Citing Gozlon-Peretz v. U.S., 498 U.S.395 (1991), the Court said that "analysis resolves the automatic excludability inquiry because '[a] specific provision' (here, subparagraph (D)) 'controls one[s] of more general application' (here, subsections (h)(1) and (h)(7)).

Further, citing Zedner v. U.S., 547 U.S. 489 (2006), which similarly dealt with the Speedy Trial Act, the Court held that its determination that the delay at issue is not automatically excludable "gives full effect to subsection (h)(7), and respects its provisions for excluding certain types of delay only where a district court makes findings justifying the exclusion. The Court’s precedents also support this reading of subsection (h)(1)."


In deciding Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States, the Court found "attorneys who provide bankruptcy assistance to assisted persons are 'debt relief agencies' under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) By definition, 'bankruptcy assistance' includes several services commonly performed by attorneys, e.g., providing 'advice, counsel, [or] document preparation,'" [ 11 U. S. C. §101(12A) ]

Plaintiffs in the initial litigation were a law firm and others who had filed a pre-enforcement suit seeking declaratory relief, arguing that they were not bound by the BAPCPA's debt-relief-agency provisions and therefore could freely advise clients to incur additional debt or have to make the requisite disclosures in their advertisements.

In its syllabus the Court recounted that the District Court of Minnesota found that "debt relief agency" does not include attorneys and that §§526 and 528 are unconstitutional as applied to that class of professionals. The Eighth Circuit affirmed inpart and reversed in part, rejecting the District Court's conclusion that attorneys are not "debt relief agenc[ies]"; upholding application of §528's disclosure requirements to attorneys; and finding §526(a)(4)unconstitutional because it broadly prohibits debt relief agencies from advising assisted persons to incur any additional debt in contemplation of bankruptcy even when the advice constitutes prudent pre-bankruptcy planning. [ 11 U.S.C. §526 11 U.S.C. §528 ]

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