Ohio Statute of Limitations on Child Sex Abuse Not Enhanced by Repressed Memories

On April 14, 2008, a Greene County, Ohio woman filed a complaint claiming she had been sexually assaulted and molested at least three times -- the last in the fall of 1984 – but that she had repressed memories of the abuse until they surfaced 23 years later on April 20, 2007, triggered by the killings on the campus of Virginia Tech.

The trial court dismissed the complaint holding the period of limitations applicable to actions involving claims of childhood sexual abuse [ ORC 2305.111(C) ] had expired.

On appeal, the 2nd. District Court began its deliberation with a recapitulation of the history of statutory limitation period for childhood sexual abuse actions, noting that the Supreme Court had expressly adopted a limitations period in 1994 with its holding in Doe v. First United Methodist Church (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 531, 629 N.E.2d 402. There the Court held that"[a] cause of action premised upon acts of sexual abuse is subject to the one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery." A minor victim, however, "has one year from the date he or she reaches the age of majority to assert any claims against the perpetrator arising from the sexual abuse." This rule, the 2nd District noted, applied only "where the victim knows the identity of the perpetrator and is fully aware of the fact that a battery has occurred." (2nd District opinion )

Later that same year, in Ault v. Jasko (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 114, 637 N.E.2d 870, the Supreme Court addressed the situation where a minor victim repressed memories of the alleged abuse. The "discovery rule," it held, applied to toll the limitations period in such situations… The limitations period did not begin to run until "the victim recalls or otherwise discovers that he or she was sexually abused, or when, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, the victim should have discovered the sexual abuse."

It was this second premise upon which the current case made its way to the Supreme Court now, though it, like the 2nd. District, disagreed.

"It is beyond dispute from the unambiguous statutory language that R.C. 2305.111(C) governs a claim resulting from childhood sexual abuse," the Court said. "That statute clearly provides that a cause of action brought by a victim of childhood sexual abuse asserting any claim resulting from childhood abuse accrues upon the date on which the victim reaches the age of majority.

"The only exception to the accrual of the cause of action on the date the victim reaches the age of majority is when the defendant fraudulently conceals facts from the plaintiff. While R.C. 2305.111(C) explicitly sets forth a tolling provision for cases involving fraudulent concealment, the statute does not contain a tolling provision for persons with repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse. The legislature could have included a tolling provision for repressed memory, but it chose not to do so. That decision is a legislative prerogative that we are not permitted to overrule."


[ Summary of Supreme Court’s decision ]